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PROPOSED SEC RULES FOR PRIVATE OFFERINGS:
THE IMPACT ON VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to facilitate venture capital financing, corporations rely
upon the private offering exemption' from the registration and
prospectus requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.2 In an
attempt to prevent this exemption from serving as a conduit for
the flow of securities into the public securities markets, the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has proposed new rules
regulating the resale of securities purchased in a private offering. 3
These proposals would alter, among other things, the existing
holding period, sales limitation, and financial information require-
ments.
This article will examine the impact of the proposed *rules on
venture capital financing of small corporations. Special emphasis
will be placed upon the proposed revised rule 144, released by
the SEC on September 14, 1971. By way of background, it is first
necessary to consider the importance of venture capital to small
corporations and the nature of present law and SEC policy in this
area.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL
To SMALL CORPORATIONS
The capital for initiating a small corporation comes almost
totally from the organizing group of owners. At some time,
however, the corporation may find that its growth is restricted
because it is not generating sufficient internal funds and the own-
ers lack additional personal funds to invest in their corporation.
Although the business must then seek outside capital, 5 it is often
1 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1970).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970). See U.S.C.§§ 77(f), (g), (h), and (j) for the registration
statement and the prospectus requirements.
3 The rule 160 series is discussed in Securities Act Release No. 4997 (September 15,
1969); proposed rule 144 in Securities Act Release No.. 5087 (September 22, 1970); and
revised proposed rule 144 in Securities Act Release No. 5186 (September 14, 197 1).
4 H. BROOM AND J. LONGENECKER, SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 1966), at
187- 188.
5 It is recognized that small corporations are also financed through credit financing;
however, funds from this source are available to the small corporation only to a limited
extent. Difficulty raising credit funds is experienced because of the lenders' preference for
secure holdings. Moreover, during periods of general monetary restraint, the impact of a
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hindered from doing so by its undiversified business operations
(frequently a single market and financial locality) and keen com-
petition from other firms.6
Raising capital is essentially a bargaining process based upon
the relative strength of the firm and the investors in relation to the
risks and urgency of capital requirements. If the potential rewards
relative to the risk are attractive or if risk can be reduced by
contractual or management devices, 7 the small business and the
investor can usually agree on a mutually satisfactory financing
arrangement. While most investors are reluctant to invest in a
small corporation, the venture capitalist is particularly interested
in its investment possibilities.
The venture capitalist generally invests early in the corporate
life of a business by providing "seed" capital, that is, capital for
initiating the corporation and for those financial needs arising
several years before the corporation seeks capital through the
public securities markets. Here the risk is tremendous, but the
prospect of large returns often proves worth the risk.8 To a lesser
extent, venture capitalists also invest at a later stage in the corpo-
ration's life, usually just prior to a public offering of securities.9 Of
"tight" credit market is more severe on the small firms. For these reasons, if financial
institutions lend money to these small corporations at all, it is invariably on a
high-collateral, short-term basis, resulting in higher interest rates and greater costs. H.
BROOM, supra note 4, at 187-207. See also: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA [Small Business
Administration (SBA) Report], EQUITY AND LONG-TERM FINANCING FOR SMALL MANU-
FACTURING FIRMS IN MINNESOTA 18-29 (1962); UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA [SBA
Report], FINANCING 689 SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1958- 1959 at 33
(1960); UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH DAKOTA [SBA Report], FINANCING SMALL BUSINESS IN
SOUTH DAKOTA 78-79 (1960); UNIVERSITY OF MAINE [SBA Report], SOURCES AND
AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO SMALL MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN MAINE 82 (1962).
6 UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, supra note 5, at 121.
7 Restrictions may include the prohibition of raising capital from other sources and of
dividend pay-outs above a specified limit; there may also be a provision which allows the
financier to assume control if the corporation finds itself in an unstable financial condition.
s Most recent activity in venture capital has been in the high technology areas where the
risks are great because of the industry involved and the stiff competition. For these
reasons, venture capitalists have definite approaches, like the approach utilized by Data
Science Ventures. Here, academic specialists in computers and data processing are hired,
taught what they have to know about finance (this particular aspect is unusual in the
venture capital industry), and assigned a maximum of four investments each, which they
are to monitor. The Money Men: Improving on the General-Collins of Data Science
Ventures, 105 FORBES, April 15, 1970, at 78.
5lExamples of this investor type are insurance companies like Prudential, Wall Streeters
like Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette, and large industrial firms like Singer, American
Broadcasting, Swift, Boise Cascade, and others. See, Has the Bear Market Killed Venture
Capital? 105 FORBES, June 15, 1970, at 28-29, 42; The Money Men: What do you do with
$81 Million? Edgar F. Heizer, Jr. of Heizer Corp. in Chicago, 106 FORBES, July 15, 1970,
at 44. It is this aspect of venture capital which has been hardest hit by the recent tight
money squeeze in the economy. To spread the risks around, to assure themselves of
adequate second-round financing, and to draw out this hidden money, some venture
capitalists have set up partnerships on a participation basis for specific investments.. This
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course the pay-off is less, but so is the risk. In addition to meeting
the capital requirements of the small corporation, venture capital-
ists often provide managerial and financial consulting services to
the developing enterprise. 10 This is designed to alleviate problems
which may arise from inexperienced management and thus, to
some extent, minimize the risk of investment.
There are various reasons why a small corporation would pre-
fer private placement of securities with a venture capitalist as
opposed to a public offering. The absence of an extended oper-
ating history, the lack of a profitable operation, or an erratic
financial history serve to make a new offering undesirable to the
potential public investor."1 Although projections of future busi-
ness performance might reduce the degree of investor uncertainty,
the SEC prohibits their use in the prospectus and registration
statement issued prior to a public offering.' 2 On the other hand,
sophisticated private investors analyze all of the relevant data,
including projections, before deciding whether to invest in a busi-
ness.1 3
Private placements are also cheaper and consume less time
than public offerings. The cost of going public for a small corpo-
ration trying to raise one million dollars through a public stock
offering could easily reach 20 percent of the face amount of the
stock.14 In contrast, private placement does not involve costly
registration requirements or the preparation of a lengthy pro-
spectus. Additionally, while public offerings generally take
months of preparation, a private placement can "raise millions in
as little time as 96 hours.' 15
has been a very satisfactory arrangement, as evidenced by the success of The Group in
San Francisco. 105 FORBES, June 15, 1970, at 29.
10 FORBES, supra note 8.
1 SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS-A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as THE WHEAT RE-
PORT]. This was a study which evaluated the entire area of disclosure with a view to
constructive recommendations for improvements.
12 Reports to the SEC are based on historical financial data.
13 Private Placement: The "New" Money Game, 93 DUN'S REVIEW, February, 1969, at
24.
14 Id. at 8 1. The cost breakdown is approximated as follows:
a. No less than 10 percent to the underwriter (usually investment bankers
also demand warrants);
b. $25,000 Finder's fees;
c. 15,000 Legal fee;
d. 7,500 Accountant's fee for certified statements;
:. 10,000 Printing expenses;
f. 15,000 Public relations firm to handle the annual report;
g. 15,000 "Blue-sky" or otherwise unaccountable extras.
$187,500 Approximated total expenses.
15 Id. at 24.
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Public offerings lift the "veil of privacy" from the affairs of the
corporation, and "it can be embarrassing to reveal what the public
(and competitors) wish to learn."'16 Since private placements are
"financial contracts," the terms of which generally remain undis-
closed to the public, this form of financing allows "more flexibility
for complicated transactions and greater facility in making sub-
sequent changes in the sales documents.' 17
The most important factor favoring the private placement of a
small corporation's securities can only be discerned from an ob-
jective viewpoint. Management may become too price conscious
and push for growth solely in order to influence a higher
price-earnings ratio. 18 When a new public corporation misses its
earnings or growth projections, the company finds it difficult to
obtain additional public financing. 19 On the other hand, the ex-
perienced venture capitalist is not greatly influenced by early
price-earnings ratios. He generally realizes this is a long term
investment and has sufficient money in reserve to invest in the
corporation on very short notice.0
In view of these considerations, it is not surprising that the
demand for venture capital far exceeds its availability. 2 ' Out of
every five hundred potential investments, a venture capitalist will
generally invest in only two or three.22 Even so, "out of every ten
investments made, two or three will go down the tube, three or
four will rock along, and the remainder may prove outstanding."2 3
Only the professional financiers survive in this business, for most
decisions are based purely on their well-developed instincts. Al-
though they can look for solid earnings, great potential, and sound
management, because of the absence of a sound financial history
the ultimate decision is instinctive. 24
Thus, the venture capitalist is important in the development of
new corporate business. Since small corporations rely heavily
upon the availability of venture capital through private placement
of securities, the proposed changes in the SEC rules for this type
of investment could have a profound effect upon the financing of
new business in the United States.
16 UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, supra note 5, at 50-5 1.
17 Wood, The Investment-Intent Dilemma in Secondary Transactions, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1043 (1964), reprinted inABA, SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
145 (1968) (H. Wander and W. Grienenberger, eds.).
18 UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, supra note 5.
19 Id.; see also 105 FORBES, supra note 9, at 30.
20 105 FORBES, supra note 9, at 30.
21 Venture Capital, Corporation Style, 106 FORBES, August, 1970, at 42. In June, 1970,
an estimated 500 million dollars was available for venture capital investment.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 105 FORBES, supra note 9, at 28-29.
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III. PRESENT LAW AND SEC POLICY
A. Scope
The reasons for the enactment of the Securities Act of 193325
and the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 were threefold: to
provide information to investors so they could arrive at their own
rational investment decisions, to protect the investor from fraud
and misrepresentation in the purchase of new securities, and to
deter questionable business practices through appropriate public-
ity.27 Although the 1933 Act covered the issuer, underwriter, and
dealer, 28 the primary emphasis was on the issuer since he was the
major source of financial information required to be disclosed.
1. Private Offering-The 1933 Act was designed to regulate
new public offerings of securities. The principal provision, section
5, prohibits the offer or sale through any instrumentality of in-
terstate commerce or the mails of any security which has not
conformed with the registration and prospectus requirements of
the Act.29 Although certain other securities3 0 and transactions3 l
are exempt from section 5, the section 4(2) transactional ex-
emption for private financing, which provides that section 5 is not
applicable to "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering," 32 is most important to the small corporation. The Act
specifically provides that a transaction will be deemed a public
offering whenever the purchaser intends to distribute the secu-
rities to other investors.
In general, determining whether a transaction is a public
offering involves a consideration of the number of offerees, the
relationship between the offerees and issuer,33 and the adequacy
of information exchanged between these parties. Thus, in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co.,3 4 the United States Supreme Court held that
stock issued to the company's employees was a public offering,
because these employees did not have access to the kind of
information disclosed in a registration statement. In developing
this "knowledge of the offeree" concept, the Court rejected the
straight numerical test3 5 which exempted offerings which are
25 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
28 15 U.S.C.§ 78 (1970).
27 THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note 11, at 10.
28 15 U.S.C.§ 77(d)(1) (1970).
29 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(0, (g), and (j) for the registration
statement and the prospectus requirements.
30 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1970).
31 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1970).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(2) (1970).
33 Securities Act Release No. 4552 (November 16, 1962).
34 346 U.S. 119 (1932).
35 Id. at 125.
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made, to a limited number of offerees. Nevertheless, an offering to
a small number of offerees (generally less than twenty-five) who
are close to, and have sophisticated knowledge of, the corporation
will probably be exempt.3 6
2. Subsequent Resale- A second problem arises when the ini-
tial offering is proper, but resales by the purchaser change the
private offering into a public distribution. The section 4(1) trans-
actional exemption, covering a sale made by "any person other
than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer, 37 is available to the typical
shareholder selling his securities. A purchaser under a transaction
exempted by section 4(2) who subsequently sells his stock is not
an issuer or a dealer, but may be an underwriter as defined by
section 2(11) of the 1933 Act.3 8 Whether this resale is a public
distribution involves an analysis of the "nature, scope, size, type
and manner of the offering."3 9 Significantly, whenever such resale
is determined to be a public distribution, the issuer's underlying
private offering exemption under section 4(2) is lost.4 0
In order to safeguard against public resale, an issuer may resort
to several devices. The first of these is the investment letter,
which is a statement from the purchaser which represents that
acquisition of the securities is for investment purposes and not for
distribution. Unfortunately, placing exclusive reliance on the in-
vestment letter is risky, as evidenced by In re The Crowell-Collier
Publishing Company.41 Crowell-Collier privately placed certain
convertible debentures some of which were immediately con-
verted into common stock and distributed. The SEC concluded
that this financing arrangement violated section 5 of the 1933 Act.
Regarding the investment letters, the Commission stated that the
"issuer may not establish claim to an exemption merely by col-
lecting investment representations from a limited group of pur-
chasers if, in fact, a distribution by such person occurs." 42
Alternatively, the issuer might utilize two devices which
effectively prohibit resale of privately placed securities. The first
device is the affixation of a restrictive legend to the face of the
certificate, indicating the existence of a restriction on the transfer
of that security. Notice is therefore given to the purchaser or the
36 Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 33.
37 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(1) (1970).
38 15 U.S.C. § 77(B)(1 1) (1970). The statutory definition of underwriter is "any person
who has purchased from an issuer with a view to... the distribution of any security."
39 Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 33.
40 id.
41 Securities Act Release No. 3825 (August 12, 1957).
42 Id.
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transfer agent that a subsequent transfer is void without the is-
suer's permission. The second device involves instituting a stop
transfer notice with the transfer agent.43 Although these devices
may be particularly effective, they create an obvious in-
convenience for the purchaser.
The relationship between investment intent and the private
offering becomes clear only when the purchaser desires to dispose
of his investment through a public offering. At that time, the
original placement is scrutinized to analyze the purchaser's in-
tent-was it to invest or to distribute? Evidence of investment
intent is primarily derived from the length of time securities are
held by the purchaser. With respect to how long the securities
must be held in order to prove investment intent, the present rule
is vague and no definitive answer can be given. 44 However, the
longer the holding period, the more likely the SEC will find
investment intent.
B. Re-examination of Disclosure Policy:
A Need for Change
The 1933 Act was designed to prevent investor fraud in the
new issues market where the pressure to sell was greatest. Today
the emphasis is still on the prevention of fraud, but the focus of
regulation has shifted to the trading markets and the continuous
disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act.'5 This shift in emphasis
recognizes that today sales pressure is as great in the resale
market as in the original issues market, and that it is therefore
more effective to regulate the broker than the issuer.
In connection with the private offering exemption and in-
vestment intent, certain criticisms exist which reflect upon the
administration of the present laws. The application of vague and
imprecise standards leads to investor uncertainty 46 When there is
serious doubt as to the purchaser's subjective investment intent or
when the issuer will not remove the security restrictions, the
purchaser may resort to the "change of circumstances" doctrine
4 Securities Act Release No. 5121 (December 30, 1970). Although the issuer is
protected through notice to the transfer agent, this method is conducive to defrauding a
subsequent investment purchaser. Therefore, the restrictive legend is preferred since it
extends protection to both the original issuer and the subsequent purchaser.
4 Morrow, The Investment Letter Dilemma and Proposed Rule 144: A Retreat to
Confusion, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 37, 41 (1970).
4 THE WHEAT REPORT 58-59.
46 Id. at 174.
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and seek a "no-action" letter.4 7 But the outcome is uncertain,4 8
because the doctrine is applied in an imprecise and subjective
manner. In addition, inequities may result since the present rules
may prevent non-controlling security holders from selling in-
definitely, while a change of circumstances may allow a con-
trolling security holder to publicly sell a considerable amount of
his holdings. 49
The confusion stemming from these vague standards has pro-
duced two detrimental consequences. In attempting to respond to
the numerous requests for interpretative advice and no action
letters, the workload of the SEC's staff has expanded so much
that its efficiency has decreased. 50 Also, the integrity of the SEC
will soon be challenged if it continues to provide inconsistent
advice .51 Finally, the confusion as to when and how private
shares may be publicly offered has provided "an unfortunate
leeway for the unscrupulous. '5 2
The SEC also faces a challenge in another area. When the
evidence strongly suggests a flagrant registration violation, these
vague standards work against the SEC; substantial manpower
must be used to prove intent and all of the surrounding circum-
stances. 53 The result is an even greater drain on the SEC's man-
power and efficiency.
These criticisms have arisen because the SEC has tried to
provide too much flexibility. The regulatory goal is public dis-
closure of financial information for investor decision-making.
From the standpoint of this regulatory goal, the vague and impre-
cise change of circumstances doctrine and holding period limita-
tion are irrelevant because they do not provide the prospective
purchaser with needed information; rather, they serve only as a
47 Securities Act Release No. 4552, supra note 33. For the investor who is "locked"
into an investment for a long holding period, relief is provided through the change of
circumstances doctrine. Recognizing that original investment intent may change due to a
subsequent change in the investor's circumstances, the SEC's review process entails the
"no action" letter and an analysis of all the relevant facts. In discussing this, the WHEAT
REPORT, at 167, stated: "The substantiality of the required change of circumstances varies
directly with the length of time between purchase and sale." Thus, the shorter the length of
time, the more drastic the change required.
48 Sowards, The Wheat Report and Reform of Federal Securities, 23 VAND L. REV.
495,505-506 (1970).
49 THE WHEAT REPORT 168.5 0 Id. at 175.
51 Id. at 176.
52 Id. at 177. The Wheat Report went on to state: "it has been the Commission's
experience that unprincipled counsel will often give opinions on the availability of ex-
emption from registration when careful or responsible counsel would not do so." Id.
53 Id.
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basis for ad hoc relief to present investors who would otherwise
be locked into their investments. 54
In addition to the problems connected with the present rules,
one writer concisely states the more general problems accom-
panying the disclosure policies of the 1933 and 1934 Acts:
First, the American shareholder population has increased
from 6,490,000 in 1952 to 26,400,000 in 1968. Accom-
panying this growth has been a vast increase in the number of
investment decisions which are based, directly or indirectly,
on information disclosed by corporations. Second, an in-
creased demand for accurate and adequate disclosure has
resulted from an increase in professionalism within the in-
vestment business .... Third, the 1964 Amendments to the
Securities Act have made it more practicable to integrate the
disclosure required by the Securities Act [the 1933 Act] and
the Exchange Act [the 1934 Act]. Finally, faster, less ex-
pensive methods of distributing to interested parties the in-
formation disclosed to the S.E.C. are now available mainly
through the use of the microfiche system. 55
IV. PROPOSED RULES
A. Rule 160 Series
1. Explanation-Acting upon the Wheat Report's recommen-
dations, the SEC proposed the rule 160 series. 56 These proposals
attempted to further the objectives of disclosure, inhibit the devel-
opment of public securities markets where the issuers have not
disclosed material information about themselves, and permit limit-
ed quantity sales in ordinary transactions when the issuer has
made adequate disclosure. 57
Rule 160 extended the definition of "underwriter" in section
2(11) of the 1933 Act to include "any person who disposes of a
restricted security in a distribution. "5 8 This objectively defined
the term underwriter without reference to state of mind or purity
of intent when the securities were purchased and therefore would
have removed a large area of uncertainty in the Act.
5 In addition, the present disclosure regulations give rise to enforcement problems.
Interstate, public securities markets are now permitted to develop "prior to the time the
issuer has made disclosure of its affairs by registering under the '33 or '34 Acts." These
markets are the ones which the "disclosure policy should strive to prevent." Wheat, The
Disclosure Policy Study of the SEC, 24 Bus. LAW 33, 43 (1968).
55 Comment, Securities Regulation -The Wheat Report Proposals, 35 MISSOURi L.
REV. 188, 189 (1970).
56 Securities Act Release No. 4997 (September 15, 1969).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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Rule 161 defined "restricted security" as any security acquired
directly or indirectly from its issuer or affiliate in a transaction
which was not a public offering. This restriction was removed if
the security was not traded for any five consecutive years during
which the issuer had annual gross revenues from operations of at
least $250,000, or if the security was subsequently registered. 59
Rule 162 defined the term "distribution" as any public offering
of a security. 60 Rule 162 did, however, permit the resale of rule
163 "qualified securities," if the securities were held for at least
one year, no more than 1 percent of the outstanding securities
were sold in any six month period, and the securities were sub-
sequently sold in an unsolicited brokerage transaction with the
broker acting as the seller's agent.6 1
Rule 162 distinguished between reporting and non-reporting
companies while rule 163 set forth the criteria for this distinction.
In general, reporting companies were those companies which had
total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security
held by 750 or more persons or which were listed on a national
securities exchange.6 2 Limited public offerings of reporting com-
panies were exempted from the rule 162 definition of "dis-
tribution." 63
Finally, broker's transactions were extended to include transac-
tions where the broker acted for an affiliate of the issuer or a
person selling a restricted security. The broker was exempted
from the requirements of section 5 if, after a reasonable inquiry,
he believed that the sale was not a distribution and if he did not
solicit a buy order.64
2. Critique-The proposed rules were severely criticized. In
order to inhibit the development of public markets for securities
when the issuer had not disclosed sufficient information, the new
distribution definition only allowed limited resales of qualified
securities (rule 163) after a one year holding period. The SEC
believed that this holding period was too short and would allow
sales of large amounts of unregulated securities. 65 However, ad-
vocates of the one year holding period viewed it as a means of
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(b) (1970) sets forth the requirements for listing on a national
securities exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78(I)(g) (1970), with certain exceptions, extends the
registration requirements to all companies with total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a
class of equity security held by 750 or more persons. 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(d)(1970), provides
that the SEC may require additional information from a registered company.
63 Securities Act Release No. 4997, supra note 56.
64 Id.
6 Securities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970).
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precluding sales of unregistered securities through the medium of
a conduit.66 As one advocate stated:
If the initial purchaser from the issuer is required to be at
significant investment risk for a period of time, the potential
loophole of sales to the public by the issuer through a conduit
is closed.67
The rule 160 series also distinguished between reporting and
non-reporting companies. A purchaser of securities from a report-
ing company could sell limited quantities of the security after one
year; a purchaser from a non-reporting company was prohibited
from any public resale for a five year period. To effectuate this
rule, the SEC was required to maintain a current list of "qualified
issuers" reporting companies. But the SEC did not have
"sufficient staff available for this purpose"68 and feared that use of
the term "qualified issuer" would carry an implication of the
SEC's approval of the reporting company on the basis of its
investment merit. 69
A basic objection to the reporting/non-reporting concept of the
rule 160 series was raised by the Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee:
It is difficult to quarrel, on practical grounds, with the basic
dichotomy between reporting and non-reporting companies.
However, the adoption by the Commission, as a matter of
interpretation of the provisions of the '33 Act, of a distinction
which could not possibly have been made if there had been
no '34 Act and no 1964 Amendments thereof, reflects the
extent to which legislation in other areas of the securities
field, subsequent to the '33 Act, is recognized by the Com-
mission as having brought about a de facto amendment of the
'33 Act. 70
The Committee is questioning the legislative impact of the SEC's
rule-making authority.
The 1933 and 1934 Acts require full disclosure, but it was
suggested that the rule 160 series, by requiring that before resale
restricted securities be held for five consecutive years during
which the issuing company has annual gross revenues of at least
$250,000, would go beyond full disclosure and enter the realm of
6 Letter from Carl W. Schneider to SEC, October 20, 1970.
67 Id.
68 Securities Act Release No. 5087,supra note 65.
69 Id. A neutral term such as "reporting company" could have solved this problem.
Schneider, supra note 66, at 4.
70 Throop, Federal Regulation of Securities Committee Comments on the Wheat Re-
port, 25 Bus LAW 39, 44 (1968).
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corporate regulation. 71 Others thought that five years was too
restrictive a holding period and that a shorter period would be
sufficient to afford the requisite investor protection. 72 The reason
for the annual gross revenue test of $250,000 was to protect
investors by insuring that the issuer was an active business and
not a "shell" corporation maintained for five years in order to
circumvent the five year holding period. 73 The SEC was con-
cerned that this requirement would give the impression that it was
judging the securities of these companies on their merits. 74
Finally, although the main purpose of these restrictions was to
force registration and therefore disclosure upon the issuer, in the
opinion of some writers, the rules would not have resulted in
increased registration:
By and large, the effect of a rule that minor sales cannot be
made without registration has not been to cause registration.
Rather, it has been to discourage sales entirely, since issuers
have been unwilling to incur the numerous burdens of regis-
tration. As a consequence, controlling and investment holders
have been forced to'assume a serious degree of non-liquidity
for their securities which is not justified by the underlying
policy objectives of the 1933 Act. 75
After analyzing all of these criticisms, the SEC concluded that the
rule 160 series unduly restricted the investment of capital in the small
corporation. 76 The severe curtailment of the liquidity and flexibility of
private investment was not worth the certainty that might result in this
area.77 For these reasons, the rule 160 series was replaced by proposed
rule 144.
B. An Alternative: Proposed Rule 144
1. Explanation-The SEC proposed rule 144 in order to pro-
vide "more objective standards for determining when a person
may be presumed not to be an underwriter or not to be engaged in
a distribution" 78 under the 1933 Act.
Rule 144 states that any person who offers or sells securities of
an issuer is presumed not to be an underwriter and not to be
.71 Interview with Thomas Geis, Professor of Finance at the University of Michigan
School of Business Administration, May 28, 197 1.
72 Throop, supra note 70, at 46.
73 Id. at 48.
74 Securities Act Release No. 5087, supra note 65.
75 Schneider, supra note 66, at I.
76 Securities Act Release No. 5087, supra note 65.
77 Chambers, Gist for Wheat: The New SEC Ground Rules for Venture Capital, 25
Bus. LAW, 1001, 1005 (1970).
78 Securities Act Release No. 5087, supra note 65.
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engaged in a distribution, 79 if all of the following conditions are
met:
(1) Holding Period: For at least the last eighteen months, the
offeror must have owned and paid for his securities, and must
not have acquired any new securities of this same class. 80
(2) Limitation on Amount of Securities:
(a) Within the last twelve months, all sales by or for the
offeror shall not exceed:
(i) if unlisted, 1 percent of the shares outstanding, or
(ii) if listed, the lesser of 1 percent of the shares out-
standing or the largest trading volume during any week
within the last four calendar weeks. 81
(b) All sales under this rule within the preceding twelve
months must not exceed twice the maximum amount per-
mitted in (a) above.82
(3) Current Public Information: Current financial and other in-
formation concerning the issuer must be made public in order
to provide full and fair disclosure to investors. This in-
formation is presumed available if the issuer files under sec-
tions 1383 or 15(d) 84 of the 1934 Act. In other situations, the
seller and broker have the option of determining whether
adequate current information has been published or furnished
to security holders.8 5
(4) Manner of Offering: The seller must not have any material
non-public information about the issuer which he has not
disclosed to the broker, and the transaction must be made
through a broker acting as agent for the seller.
8 6
In addition to the proposed rule, the SEC also stated that if
rule 144 were adopted, "no action" letters based on change of
circumstances in individual investment situations would no long-
er be issued; rather the seller would have the burden of determin-
ing whether an exemption was available under the change of
circumstances doctrine.8 7
2. Critique-In general, rule 144 does not itself alter existing
law and SEC policy with respect to investment or the change of
19 Id. Proposed SEC R. 144(a).80 Id. Proposed SEC. R 144(a)(1).
81 Id. Proposed SEC. R 144(a)(2)(A).
82 Id. Proposed SEC R. 144(a)(2)(B).
83 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1970) states the type of information required for companies filing
under § 78 (1). This includes information to keep registration statement information cur-
rent, annual reports, quarterly reports, and any other information required by the SEC.
84 15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(d) (1970).
8 Proposed SEC R. 144(a)(3),supra note 56.
86 Id. Proposed SEC. R. 144(a)(4).
87 Securities Act Release No. 5087, supra note 65.
[VOL. 5":1
Proposed SEC Rules
circumstances doctrine; rather, it merely provides additional tests
for determining when a resale is to be permitted without registra-
tion. 8 However, the rule fails in its attempt to provide objective
standards for the resale of securities.
Rule 144 provides that if all of its conditions are met, the seller
of a security will be presumed not to be an underwriter. This is a
substantial change from the current rule 154, which provides that
if its conditions are met the seller is not an underwriter. There is
some doubt as to whether rule 144's presumption is intended to
be conclusive or rebuttable; 9 if it is rebuttable, the seller will face
the onerous task of determining whether all the conditions have
been fulfilled.
The text of rule 144 did not discuss the change of circum-
stances doctrine, but the accompanying securities release9" an-
nouncing the rule stated that
the staff [of the SEC] will not issue . . . "no action" . . . letters
with respect to "changes in circumstances" which might war-
rant the sale of securities sooner than the rule provides .... If
a person is to rely upon a "change in circumstances," .... he
must sustain the burden of showing that such change is legal-
ly sufficient to justify sale of the securities .... -[C]hanges in
circumstances" relate only to the holding period and not to
the other provisions of the rule.91
Thus, the change of circumstances doctrine is intended to survive,
but the SEC has indicated that in the future it will be applied more
restrictively.
As the above release states, the change of circumstances doc-
trine will now only apply to the holding period.92 The implication
from that language is that the minimum holding period under rule
144 can be accelerated to permit resale? 3 Nevertheless, since the
release further provides that the change of circumstances doctrine
will not apply to any other provisions of the rule, a seller could be
classified as an underwriter despite any change of circumstances
"unless he limits the quantity and method of his sales as provided
in the rule." 94
This approach has been criticized for two reasons. First, rule
144 alters the well-established application of the change of cir-
cumstances doctrine without the use of the SEC's rule-making
88 MORROW, supra note 44, at 49.
89 Id.
90 Securities Act Release No. 5087, supra note 65.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Schneider, supra note 66, at I.
94 Id.
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authority.9 5 Second, although some believe that the change of
circumstances doctrine does not promote the public's need for
current information,9 6 if the doctrine is to survive, the SEC should
continue the "no action" letter practice.9 7 Indeed, the SEC should
also publicly release its conclusions, "so that a body of 'case law'
may develop for the guidance of the Bar."981
Under the current rule 154, the holding period, which functions
as a presumption of investment intent, ranges from twenty-four to
thirty-six months and thus is indefinite.9 9 The eighteen month
holding period in rule 144 attempts to rectify this situation. After
the eighteen month period, the rule provides for limited leakage
(limited sales) over a twelve month period. This seems unreason-
able because it constitutes a doubling of the leakage time under
the current rule 154, thus effectively cutting in half the potential
distribution by a control person. 100 Moreover, the holding period
applies to all securities purchased by a control person, even in a
public market.' 0 ' But there is absolutely no statutory or policy
basis for this limitation if the sale is not a "distribution." 99
Other leakage provisions of rule 144 also severely restrain
sales of unregistered securities by control persons. The 1 percent
formula over a one year period is unduly restrictive; even more so
is the 2 percent absolute maximum leakage provision.' 03 Under
this latter provision, all sales under rule 144 by any person in the
control group (defined as all directors, officers and affiliates of the
issuer and their associates) 10 4 are limited to 2 percent of the
outstanding shares during any twelve month period. The practical
effect will be that controlling persons must reduce their sales
because of the amount of sales by others in the control group.
Inequities among the control group members will occur since
members will be forced to sell early in the period to prevent later
preclusion from sale.' 0 5 Also, enforcement will be difficult since
there is no standard to identify the group or to keep track of their
group sales. 10 6 Finally, the proposed numerical test is inflexible,
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.; see also Morrow, supra note 44, at 49, for a general discussion of this problem.
98 Schneider, supra note 66, at I.
99 Rice, Potential Effects of Pending Securities and Exchange Commission Rules on
Private Financing and Business Acquisitions, 23 STAN. L. REV. 287, 289 (197 1).
100 Id. at 290- 291; see also Schneider, supra note 66, at 2; and Morrow, supra note 44,
at 51.
101 Morrow, supra note 44, at 50-5.
102 Schneider, supra note 66, at 3.
103 Morrow, supra note 44, at 51.
104 Securities Act Release No. 5087, supra note 65, at 6.
105 Morrow, supra note 44, at 5 1.
106 Id. at 52.
[VOL. 5":1
Proposed SEC Rules
because it would not permit a seller whose sales exceed the I
percent limitation to show that in light of the amount of the
issuer's securities outstanding his sale is insignificant. 10 7 The cur-
rent rule 154 does permit such a showing.' 08
The proposed rule 163 stated that companies required to re-
port were those companies which had total assets exceeding
$1,000,000 and a class of equity security held by 750 or more
persons or which were listed on a national securities exchange.1" 9
The reporting concept is modified slightly in proposed rule
144(a)(3) to emphasize the type of information required to be filed
by those companies under sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934
Act.110 Information required to be filed under these sections in-
cludes information and documents necessary to keep registration
statement information current, annual reports, quarterly reports,
and any other information required by the SEC."' In addition,
proposed rule 144(a)(3) extends this reporting concept to other
companies who have published or furnished financial information
to their security holders. These new reporting requirements place
the non-control person at a distinct disadvantage. If the issuer is
reporting, there is a presumption that by filing this information the
reporting requirements are satisfied. If the issuer is not reporting
pursuant to the 1934 Act requirements, then the presumption is
that the reporting standards have not been met. In order to rebut
this latter presumption the seller and broker must determine
whether adequate current information has been published or fur-
nished to the security holders. However, the non-control person,
unlike the control person, lacks information as to whether the
reporting requirements have been met and must assume a greater
risk on these transactions." 2
The impact that rule 144 might have on private financing is
substantial. 1 13 In summary, the venture capital investor, to avoid
being locked into a security for long periods of time, has generally
attempted, by means of contractual provisions, to compel the
issuer to register his securities for sale. These attempts generally
107 Rice, supra note 99, at 29 1.
108 Id. In addition, current rule 154 makes no provision for the non-control person,
consequently he must hold at least twenty-four months to "prove" investment intent
before freely selling under section 4(1) of the 1933 Act. His position has improved under
rule 144 since he can leak after eighteen months, instead of the previous twenty-four to
thirty-six month requirement. See Rice, supra note 99, at 29 1.
109 See text accompanying note 70 supra.
110 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(m), (o)(d) (1970).
111 Id.
112 Morrow, supra note 44, at 50.
113 Rice, supra note 99, at 293- 305, presents a comprehensive discussion of the impact
of rule 144 on venture capital financing.
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take the form of a "demand registration" provision1 14 or a "piggy-
back" provision.11 5 Unfortunately, demand registration, when tied
to other factors, may serve as evidence of control which will
result in forfeiture of the seller's section 4(1) exemption.
In addition, because of rule 144 brokers may be reluctant to
handle leakage (limited sale) transactions. Failure to meet the
requirements that the seller have no inside information and that
the issuer actually file current financial reports may prevent appli-
cation of the rule 144 exemption and subject the broker to civil
penalties under section 12(1) of the 1933 Act.
Rule 144's imposition of greater disabilities upon control per-
sons requires the venture capitalist to be more alert to the nega-
tive implications of control. The investor must "weigh the greater
certainty attached to a demand registration provision against the
more contingent use of leakage." 116 For additional protection, the
"control" investor should demand contractual provisions with
other members of the control group restricting their sales of
securities, so that their sales will not bar his use of rule 144.
These provisions may deter investors' participation in later
private financing, for the rule provides that the eighteen month
holding period runs from the date of the most recent security
purchase. This could severely restrict the ability of small firms to
raise subsequent capital; it may also affect the investor's initial
investment decision.
Rule 144 will deter that type of financing arrangement whereby
several investors agree to provide capital to the issuer in succes-
sive stages.11 7 Under rule 144 the full purchase price of the
securities must be paid at least eighteen months prior to the
leakage offering. Rule 144's holding period will not begin to run
until after funding obligations under the contract have been ful-
filled and the total purchase price paid. "This restriction is some-
what illogical, since an unconstitutional obligation to pay for secu-
rities is all that is required under other laws."118
C. Proposed Revised Rule 144
1. Explanation-The SEC recently released the proposed re-
114 Demand registration occurs when the issuer is required to "file a 1933 Act registra-
tion upon the investor's request."See Rice, supra note 99, at 294.
115 The piggyback provision takes the form where "the issuer, upon independently
electing to register under the 1933 Act, must afford the investor an opportunity to have the
latter's securities included in the registration on a secondary basis." Id.
116 Id. at 296.
117 Id. at 296- 298.
11 Id. at 299.
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vised rule 144.119 Under this rule the underwriting exemption for
the sale of restricted securities120 is contingent upon all of the
following conditions:
(1) Current Public Information: Adequate disclosure require-
ments are satisfied if:
(a) the issuer is registered under section 12 and files current
reports under section 13 of the 1934 Act, or is registered
under the 1933 Act and files current reports under sec-
tion 15 of the 1934 Act;' 2 ' or
(b) the issuer has satisfied the requirements set forth in rule
15c 2-11 (a)(4). 122
(2) Holding Period: For two years prior to sale, the offeror must
have beneficially owned and paid for his securities, 123 and
must not have acquired any new restricted securities of the
same issuer.' 24
(3) Limitations on Amount of Securities Sold:
(a) Within the last six months, all sales by affiliates of re-
stricted and other securities of the same class shall not
exceed;
(i) if listed, the lesser of 1 percent of the class outstanding
or the average weekly reported volume of trading over a
four calendar week period. This is determined within ten
days prior to the date of filing the notice to sell or to the
receipt by the broker of the sell order.' 25
(ii) if unlisted, 1 percent of the class outstanding as of a
date within ten days prior to the notice filing or to the
broker's receipt of the order.' 26
(b) Within the last six months, all sales by any persons 127
(other than affiliates) of all the restricted securities of the
119 Securities Act Release No. 5186 (September 14, 1971). Related sections of this
revisionary package include proposed form 144, id.; rule 237 [Securities Act Release No.
5187 (September 14, 1971)]; an amendment to regulation A [Securities Act Release No.
5188 (September 14, 1970)]; the adoption of rule 15c 2-11 [Exchange Act Release No.
9310 (September 13, 197 1)]; and the possible future extension of the anti-fraud provisions
to certain non-public transactions [a more detailed release will be published shortly,
Securities Act Release No. 5186 (September 14, 1971)].
120 Restricted security is defined as any security not acquired in a public offering.
Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(a)(3), Securities Act Release No. 5186, supra note 119.
121 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(c)(2).
122
1d. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(c)(2).
123 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(d)(1).
124 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(d)(2).
125 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(e)(!)(A).
126 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(e)(1)(B).
127 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(a)(2) sets forth a broad definition of the term
person when used in reference to one for whose account securities are to be sold in
reliance upon this rule. Included in the definition are the seller and any corporation in
which the seller holds a 10 percent interest.
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same class shall not exceed the limits specified in (3)(a)
above. 128
(4) Manner of Sale: The securities must be sold in brokers'
transactions. 29 The broker may not solicit a buy order, but
may only execute sell orders after a reasonable inquiry into
the circumstances has been made. 30
(5) Notice of Proposed Sale: In the sale of any securities under
this rule where the amount of securities is not less than 500
shares or units and the aggregate sale price is not less than
$10,000, the seller must file a sale notice on form 144131 with
the Commission.' 32
This rule would be applied prospectively 133 and proof of its
availability would rest on the seller.1 34 The change of circum-
stances doctrine would no longer be available,' 35 but letters in-
terpreting the new rule would be issued.136
In order to provide relief for the non-controlling person who
owns restricted securities and does not qualify for relief under
revised rule 144, the SEC has proposed rule 237,'137 under which
a non-controlling person is exempt from registering the sale of
securities where the domestic issuer has been a going concern for
the last five years. 138 The holding period is also five years, prior to
which the offeror must have paid for the security and must have
been the beneficial owner of the security. 139 Moreover, these
securities must be neogtiated through a non-brokerage transac-
tion.' 40
Rule 237 exempts from its requirements 1 percent of the class
of securities outstanding during any one year period . 4 ' The max-
imum gross revenue exemption for any one year is $50,000.142
128 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(e)(2).
129 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(f).
130 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(g).
131 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144.
132 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(h).
133 Securities Act Release No. 5186, supra note 119.
134 Id.
135 Id. "No action" letters would continue to be used where the security was issued
prior to the adoption of the rule. Id.
136 Id.
137This rule was issued pursuant to section 3(b) of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(c)(11)(b) which states that "the Commission may... add any ... securities to the
securities exempted ... if it finds ... the enforcement. . . is not necessary in the public
interest and for the protection of investors .. .; but no issue ... shall be exempted
... which exceeds $500,000."
138 Proposed Revised SEC R. 237(a)(1), (2), Securities Act Release No. 5187, supra
note 119.
139 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 237(a)(3).
140 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 237(a)(4).
141 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 237(b).
142This amount is subject to reduction by the amount of any securities sold under
section 3(b) of the Securities Act and by the amount of "securities of the same class sold in
[VOL. 5 :1140
Proposed SEC Rules
In a release accompanying revised rule 144, the Commission
proposed to amend regulation A, which "provides an exemption
from registration. . for limited amounts of securities of certain
issuers"' 43 by the issuance of proposed rule 254 which would
provide that offerings by or on behalf of persons other than
the issuer would not be counted against the amount which the
issuer could offer for its own account. The maximum amounts
which could be offered by the various persons during any
12-month period would be as follows: the issuer could offer
$500,000; all affiliates ... could offer in the aggregate
$100,000; and other persons could offer $100,000 each but
the aggregate amount offered by all such other persons could
not exceed $300,000.144
The adoption of rule 15c 2-11 under the 1934 Act was another
recent step taken by the SEC: 4 5
In general, Rule 15c 2-1 1 prohibits the initiation or resump-
tion of quotations respecting a security by a broker or dealer
who lacks specified information concerning the security and
the issuer.' 46
This rule highlights the increased emphasis placed upon the in-
vestment practices arising in the trading markets. 147 In particular,
it aims to prevent fraudulent and manipulative activities which, in
the absence of available information, sometimes occur during the
making of a market or during activity in infrequently-traded secu-
rities.' 48
2. Critique-Criticisms of the rule 160 series and of rule 144
were essentially categorized into two general areas: first, the
imprecision of the proposals did not reduce the uncertainty in the
investment process or in the enforcement of the regulations; and,
second, the new standards were unreasonable and adversely
affected venture capital financing. Revised rule 144 does not
completely meet these criticisms.
Revised rule 144 has eliminated some of the uncertainties exist-
ing under the old rules. The rule will be applied prospectively, 149
not retroactively. The rule eliminates the change of circumstances
reliance upon rule 144." [Rule 237(b), id.] In addition, the filing requirement of form 237,
the notice to sell provision, is similar to rule 144(h) and provides the SEC with information
for enforcement of this regulation. [Rule 237(c), id.].
143 Securities Act Release No. 5188, supra note 119.
144 Id.
145 Securities Act Release No. 9310, supra note 119.
146 id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Securities Act Release No. 5 186, supra note 119.
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doctrine, 150 but "no action" letters and letters interpreting the
revised rule will be available. 51 The problem of the holding
period has been resolved by the two year standard in rule 144152
and the five year standard in rule 237.153 Thus, the SEC has
moved closer to achieving the second goal of the Wheat Report,
that is, "to reduce the areas of uncertainty in the interpretation"
of the statutes.1 54
The reasonableness of these modifications is, however, open to
question. The SEC's reason for the two and five year holding
periods is to prevent a public distribution of securities through the
medium of a conduit.155 In this respect, revised rule 144 is more
restrictive than either of its two predecessor rules. Assuming
financial information were available, rule 160 imposed a minimum
holding period of one year, and rule 144 imposed an eighteen
month holding period. Revised rule 144 imposes a two year hold-
ing period. Since the revised rule eliminates the change in circum-
stances excuse, even in unusual circumstances, such as the
serious illness of the investor, the resale of the securities is pro-
hibited for at least two years. 156 In addition, the distinction be-
tween a controlling investor (rule 144 with its two year holding
period) and a non-controlling investor (rule 237 with its five year
holding period) is unreasonable, when the same information is
available to both investors. Likewise, there is little justification for
regulating the purchases of a sophisticated investor or of an in-
vestor who realizes that the security constitutes a speculative
investment. Greater flexibility could be provided if rule 237 were
changed to shorten the holding period to one year and to permit
transactions to be handled through a broker, thereby subjecting
the transaction to the rule 15c 2-11 requirements. This latter
change would exempt a private transaction between informed
investors and provide a control at the broker level for the unin-
formed purchaser.
The sales limitation of 1 percent within any six months peri-
150 Id.
151 id.
152 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(d)(2).
153 Id. Proposed Revised SEC R. 237(a)(2), Securities Act Release No. 5187, supra
note 119.
154 Wheat, The Disclosure Policy Study of the SEC, 24 Bus. LAW 33, 42 (1968).
155 Schneider, supra note 66, at 2.
156 Where no information is available, revised rule 144 is just as restrictive as rule 160,
since the minimum holding period is five years in both rules. Revised rule 144 is less
restrictive than rule 160 because the "successful operations" requirement has been elimi-
nated, but more restrictive since, even after a five year holding period, rule 160 allowed a
resale through a broker and the trading markets, while revised rule 144 is restricted to a
non-brokerage, private transaction. In addition, proposed rule 144 was unclear as to the
type of information necessary to fulfill the statutory requirements. Here revised rule 144 is
specific in the requirements of information, especially since the adoption of rule 15c 2-11.
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od 157 is an improvement over the original rule 144 proposal of I
percent for 1 year for a control person and a maximum 2 percent
for 1 year for the control group. However, it contradicts the
concept of a "free" market which allows the buyer and the seller
independently to transact business in a large, impersonal market
place. If the market can absorb that particular sale, the transac-
tion should be allowed so long as no broker initiative is involved.
These reasons also suggest that the $50,000 maximum for a one
year period for the non-control person 158 is unduly restrictive.
Not only is the $50,000 maximum subject to criticism, but even
more so is the requirement that this limit be reduced by other
sales under section 3(b) or rule 144. The SEC has provided some
relief in proposed rule 254 by increasing the maximum ex-
emptions allowed. 159 But these exemptions are available only if
the small firm fulfills the burdensome regulation A requirements.
These sales limitations are also unreasonable because there is no
flexibility 160 and no additional relief provided in cases of extreme
urgency or unusual circumstances.
Revised rule 144 will have substantially the same adverse
effects upon private financing as those discussed in the critique of
the original rule 144.161 The SEC recommends the use of restric-
tive legends, stop-transfer instructions, and contractual registra-
tion provisions, 162 but these items are subject to negotiation in
private financing and will affect the investors' decision. Addition-
ally, the "control" investor must consider no-sale contractual
provisions with other control members in order to protect his
exemption. Finally, like the earlier rules, Revised rule 144's re-
quirement that the security be fully paid for before the holding
period begins to run may deter future participation in successive
stages of financing.
V. CONCLUSION
By increasing the length of the holding period and abolishing,
for most purposes, the change in circumstances doctrine, pro-
posed revised rule 144 attempts to encourage registration of secu-
rities and thereby force disclosure of pertinent information to the
157 Proposed Revised SEC R. 144(e)(1)(A), (e)(l)(B), (e)(2). Securities Act Release No.
5186, supra note 119.
158 Proposed Revised SEC R. 237(b), Securities Act Release No. 5187,supra note 119.
159 Proposed Revised SEC R. 254, Securities Release Act No. 5188.
16o Rice, supra note 99, at 29 1.
161 For a thorough discussion see id. at 293-305; for a summary discussion see text
accompanying notes 113-118 supra.
162 Securities Act Release No. 5186, supra note 119.
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public. At the same time, the rule attempts to eliminate some of
the uncertainty that confronts the potential purchaser of a security
in a private offering.
Unfortunately, increasing the benefits of disclosure while min-
imizing its burdens still has not been accomplished. Moreover, the
SEC has failed to recognize that, in at least one respect, private
placement ought to be encouraged. The venture capitalist, who
gains his interest through private placement, protects the unin-
formed investor, because he helps insure the stability of the cor-
poration in its early years and thus helps insure that the in-
vestment of later investors is safe. The restrictions of revised rule
144 discourage such investment and may hinder the growth of
small corporations in the United States.
-Gregory A. Kearns
